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Philippines: Towards a memorandum for self-determination for the Moro people
By Herbert Docena
Force has
kept the Moro people within the

Without
their consent, the Moros’ and the indigenous peoples’ lands were declared
But it was not the settlers who benefited most. By the late 1980s,
more than half of the lands in the region were in the hands of a few plantation
owners, multinational corporations and logging concessionaires that extracted
the area’s resources but ploughed the wealth out of the region.[iii]
At one point, it was estimated that the region provided half of the products
being exported by the
Terrorised by militias supported by landowning politicians and
government security forces, cornered into a narrowing portion of the region,
but increasingly conscious of their collective plight, the Moros fought back.
Beginning in the 1970s, they rose to wage armed struggle against the
Memorandum
abandoned
The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), the result
of the latest round of negotiations between the Moros and the government, could
have broken that history of broken promises. Having sparked widespread and
strident opposition, however, the agreement has since been unilaterally
abandoned by the
For those committed to peace with justice, our duty does not end in
merely preventing the outbreak of full-blown fighting or calling for a
ceasefire, if such a ceasefire ends up perpetuating a status quo in which the
Moros continue to be held at gunpoint within the Philippines. It merely begins
with advocating a long-term solution that addresses and ends the historical
oppression suffered by Moros. No solution will lead to peace if it is not just;
and it won’t be just if it does not advance the Moros’ right to
self-determination. While advancing this right is not all that is required, no
solution will be complete without it.
Viewed from the precipice of a full-blown conflagration, the vision
offered by the MOA-AD becomes sharper and clearer. Though it has since been
killed, its proposals and principles – whether it retains the name or not – can
still resuscitate the moribund peace process.
A
state within a state
The MOA-AD envisions the establishment of – without as of yet
establishing – a so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), described as a
“state within a state” or a “sub-state” in an “associative relationship” with
the
This governing entity is to exercise “shared responsibility and authority”
with the Philippines government over a particular territory: the area covered
by the current Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); a number of
municipalities which voted to be with ARMM in a plebiscite in 2001 but did not
become part of the ARMM; plus another 735 villages whose residents will be
asked whether they wish to be part of the territory in a plebiscite to be held
12 months upon the signing of the MOA. Another category, encompassing around 1500
villages, are proposed to receive targeted socioeconomic assistance from the
government. After 25 years, their residents will also be asked whether they
wish to join the BJE.[vii]
The BJE is to have its own “basic law,” its own security forces, its
own system of taxation and finance, and its own political and administrative
structures, including civil service, electoral, judicial, educational and other
institutions. It may send trade missions to and enter into economic agreements
with other countries. It will be allowed to exercise greater authority over its
territory’s resources such as minerals, oil, natural gas, etc. and it will have
the power to grant or enter into resource-extraction concessions and agreements.
Royalties from these resources are to be split 75% and 25% between the BJE and
the
A
compromise
Though the MOA-AD falls far short of the Moros’ original goal of
establishing an independent state, it goes farther – and is more specific –
than any of the previous agreements in providing for greater Moro self-rule. Politically,
the BJE will have more power than the current ARMM, itself a governing entity
created as part of previous peace agreements but whose limited powers were
subsequently further eroded by the government, and which has since been
dominated by powerful clans and warlords favored by the Philippine government.
Signifying the Moros’ acceptance of the demographic changes that
resulted from the government-sponsored resettlement policies, however, the
BJE’s territory will be smaller than the area originally claimed as the
“homeland” of the Moros – and even less than the area that was supposed to have
been under Moro autonomy, as promised in the earlier 1976 Tripoli Agreement
between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government. Though
the territory is proposed to cover more villages beyond ARMM, their inclusion
is far from assured: the government, with all the advantages it enjoys, can be
expected to do all it can to win the scheduled plebiscite. Within what will
remain of BJE-governed territory, no one is to be evicted: the MOA-AD states
that existing property rights will be respected, meaning land previously
awarded by the government to settlers and corporations – as well as lands
claimed by Indigenous communities – will not be expropriated.[viii]
In other words, the MOA-AD is a compromise document. Contrary to the
widely held view that the agreement is “too good to be true” – that the
government is being too generous – the MOA-AD arguably requires more on the
part of the Moros’ than on the Philippines government. The latter won’t lose
anything more than a still undefined fraction of political and economic control
over a small part of Philippines territory – the government will still wield
“shared authority and responsibility” in ways that will only be spelled out in
a final agreement – and no individual’s or corporation’s property will be taken
away. The Moros, on the other hand, will not only be abandoning their claim for
more land or their share of resources already extracted; they will be setting
aside their dream of a country to call their own.
With
the Moros’ backing
Despite requiring more concessions from them, Moros have expressed
their readiness to accept the compromise proposed in the MOA-AD. In fact, the
agreement is being pushed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the
largest, most powerful Moro liberation organisation today -- and supported by other Moro organisations,
including those that are ideologically unaligned with the MILF, along with
non-Moro groups with Christian migrants and Indigenous peoples’ communities in
their membership.[ix]
Though the MILF’s leadership is reputed to be conservative – with
many coming from the landowning class – one does not have to be fond of the
MILF to acknowledge that the Moro people – just like any other people – have an
inherent right to self-determination. One can be vigilant about the MILF
without being oblivious to the Moro people’s rights.
Regardless of what one thinks of its politics, however, the MILF
cannot be said to be unrepresentative of the Moros’ aspirations. As an
indicator of its support among Moros, who are estimated to number around 4-5
million people, the MILF has demonstrated its capacity to mobilise at least a
million people – possibly more – for its assemblies. No other single political
group in
Such enthusiasm is, of course, not necessarily shared by all Moros.
Others within the MILF, particularly among the ulama, reportedly felt
dissatisfied with some of the MOA’s provisions, saying it doesn’t go far
enough. Some Moro leaders are reportedly not prepared to completely abandon the
bid for independence. Though it is not clear how widespread this view’s support
is within the MILF – given that such views have not been made public – it is
expected to gather more adherents if the peace talks fail yet again. What is
clear at this point is that the MILF leadership and organisation are committed
to a negotiated settlement and only they – and not the government or any other
Moro organisation today – enjoy the legitimacy to be in the position to rally
the majority of Moros behind any solution.
The other large – though increasingly marginalised and factionalised
– Moro organisation, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), is seemingly
divided on the question. Some of its key leaders have signified their support
for the agreement; MNLF founder Nur Misuari and others have gone on record to
question it. The concern, however, appears not to be that the MOA-AD fails to
advance Moro self-determination. Rather, the objection seems to spring from
apprehensions about the future of the MNLF’s earlier agreement with the
government which – with the clipped autonomy it brought – is now widely seen as
a failure.
Though the MILF will obviously be placed at an advantage in case the
BJE comes to life, its officials have repeatedly stressed that the leaders of
future governing entities will be decided by all Moros – and not just by the
MILF alone. And though the MILF leaders have said that they want to establish
an “Islamic state” in their homeland, the MILF’s vision on how this state would
look like remains vague; in fact, its position on this question has been inconsistent.
The MILF's founder has signified that the question will only be decided on
later.[xi]
Supposing the Moros do succeed in getting greater self-rule, how the
Moros will govern themselves is to be a continuing contest among Moros: it
could well be that the rich and landed Moros, many of them already with the
MILF, will only be replacing – or conniving with – current Filipino rulers in
oppressing the Moro people. But just as Filipinos – to quote former
This time though, given the way the Filipinos have been running the
country, it may well be a choice between a government run like hell by Moros
than a government already run like hell by Filipinos. In any case, Moros are
not doomed to perdition: they may actually be better at running their own
government if only they are given the chance. At this stage, the most effective
support that those who seek to extend solidarity to Moros struggling for
emancipation within Moro society is to support their struggle for emancipation
from Filipino domination.
Self-interested
pragmatism
A solution can be just, not because it satisfies what the aggressor
wants, but because it addresses what the victims deserve. It is the
Having said that, the MOA is groundbreaking in demonstrating that
the
Such perceived “generosity” has prompted some to claim that the
agreement was a trap: if it was “too good to be true,” it could only be because
it was “designed to fail.”[xii]
The government, the reasoning goes, deliberately agreed to promise things it
had no intention of giving supposedly to cast itself as the magnanimous party
that is willing but unable, as a result of the predicted opposition that will
follow, to give ground. This will then supposedly provoke large-scale fighting,
boosting public support for a war against Moros while giving the Philippines president
justification for changing the constitution
– or even a pretext for declaring martial law -- thereby allowing her to
extend her term.
Without granting that the government is actually being generous,
this scenario is problematic because it takes for granted the following
questionable assumptions: that the Philippines is in a position to continue
waging war against the Moros, that such a war will be to its benefit and that
such a war will not prove destabilising to the president’s own rule.
As it is, the war has already cost billions of pesos that a
cash-strapped government could hardly afford; underpaid and demoralised
soldiers are bogged down fighting a protracted war with other resurgent armed
groups. Should a war escalate, the government will lose more billions that it
could otherwise have spent on other expenditures. It will lose soldiers that it
could otherwise send to fight other enemies – all for a war that it is not
assured of winning.
Moreover, government negotiators could not have been aware that
giving ground on the issue of governance and territory could be an extremely
risky gambit: in recognising, and thereby according legitimacy, to the Moros’
key demands, the government has paved the way for those demands being advanced
as the Moros’ minimum set of demands in future negotiations. If the
government’s game plan at the outset was really more fighting, then agreeing to
the MOA-AD – just to lure the Moros – actually undermined its own, and not the
Moros’, position. Intentionally or not, the government has pushed out the
boundaries of what’s acceptable.
An alternative explanation for the much-vaunted “generosity” could
be this: more pragmatic, though no less self-interested, Filipino leaders – as
well as their supporters in the US – have realised that they can’t afford to
continue the war without risking greater probability of defeat at the hands of
enemies they are fighting simultaneously; that they have assessed that the overall
benefits from a negotiated solution will ultimately outweigh the costs; and
that they have accepted that a more stable Philippines, less distracted by war
on one front and with its coffers bleeding less, could stabilise the rule of
the president more.
In other words, it could well be that sections of the Philippines
government have realised that it is in their larger interest to reach a
compromise with the Moros -- not because
they support Moro self-determination but because they seek to protect their own
interests. That the government subsequently abandoned the agreement does not
necessarily prove that doing so was the intention all along; only that other
narrow interests prevailed – the rule of local politicians and landlords, the
support of business groups worried about their investments, the loyalty of
hawkish and right-wing generals, the need to prevent traditional opposition
politicians from courting the support of jingoistic sections in the media, the
church and the public.
With these interests stoking anti-Moro prejudice and Filipino
chauvinism, it is no surprise that many Filipinos appear to have rejected the
MOA-AD out of hand. Conditioned by the media, the educational system and the
larger society to view Moros with suspicion, most Filipinos have been kept
deliberately ignorant of the Moros’ marginalisation. And yet, informed of the
stakes, aware of history and empowered to have a say in the government’s
negotiating stance, the Filipino majority can potentially be the strongest
advocates for a just resolution to the war. Unlike a number of hawkish military
officials, they have no careers to build or military contracts to profit from;
only better relations with their Moro sisters and brothers to gain. Unlike the
Piñols and the Lobregats, they have no lands to protect; only a future of peace
to win.
Divided
solidarity
While many Moros – presumably the majority who support the MILF –
see in the MOA a step forward in their struggle for self-determination, those
who already profess support for their struggle – in the left and in the peace
movement – have had a harder time uniting behind it. A number of peace
coalitions, leftist parties and left-leaning social movements, have dared to
come out to counter the popular wave rejecting the agreement. Others have been
more equivocal: they have neither categorically expressed their opposition nor
support for the MOA but their pronouncements have had the effect of further
discrediting the agreement. Whether this has been intended or not, it has
contributed to the hostile public opinion against something that the Moro
movements themselves want signed.
For the most part, the point of contention has not been whether the
agreement sufficiently advances the interests of those who they claim to
support; the concern, rather, has been that the agreement could also benefit
those who they oppose. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, some fear, foisted
the MOA-AD as a “Trojan horse” to extend her stay in power. The
Even if one grants both premises, the conclusion – that the MOA,
even if good, should therefore be rejected or, at least, not actively supported
– is problematic. It burdens the Moros with impossible conditions for attaining
their aspirations: first, that the parties they negotiate with should have only
altruistic motives in their negotiations. Second, that the result of their
negotiations should not only be good for them but be bad for the other side.
Should the Moros wait until they find someone they can deal with who has only
the purest of intentions? Is it their fault that the country they see as a
colonial power happens to have a scheming president whom the opposition, which
counts the left among it, has so far failed to remove? Must a final solution
wait until the revolution is won?
Implicit in the conclusion is the evaluation that the Moros’
self-determination is secondary to the goal of unseating President Macapagal-Arroyo
or undermining US strategic objectives. Such a trade-off is unwarranted because
it should, in fact, be the task of the left and the peace movements to both prevent Macapagal-Arroyo and the
Not only is this stance more principled, it is also more strategic: replacing
the Macapagal-Arroyo administration with one that truly represents the interest
of the majority – instead of valuing only its survival by pandering to the
hawkish generals or the Lobregats – could be the first step in putting in place
a negotiating side that would commit to and defend a just and peaceful
settlement with the Moros. As the Moros strive to gain or have more power over
their government, our task is to change ours without depriving the Moros of the
chance to have theirs.
Challenging the
The alternative – explicitly or implicitly rejecting or undermining
the Moros legitimate aspirations – could end up assisting Macapagal-Arroyo and
the US in securing their goals by leaving Moros with no choice but to succumb
to their self-interested advances.
Not the Moros’ struggle alone
While the
Moros form a large marginalised minority, they have not been the only ones who
have been dispossessed and who have been resisting. The other Indigenous
peoples in the region have likewise been displaced from their lands, many
evicted by logging companies, miners, plantations and other corporate interests
with the backing of the Philippines state. Driven to migrate to Mindanao
because lands in the north remained in the grip of a few, many Christian
settlers remain poor and landless – their misery and resentment fanned and
unleashed against the Moros by the landlords and politicians who have grabbed
the most lands and resources. No solution will be just if it does not address
the injustice that has also been perpetrated against these Indigenous peoples
and Christians migrants.
As it is,
the MILF through the MOA-AD has effectively given up their claims over areas
they consider part of their homeland but which are now demographically
dominated by migrants. It is the obligation of the
Within the
BJE, no one is to be expelled. As mentioned earlier, all existing property
rights will be respected and can only be revoked with due cause. The MOA-AD explicitly states that Indigenous
peoples will be given “free choice” as to whether to be part of the BJE. The
agreement also lists the Indigenous People’s Rights Act, a
The Indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination should not be subsumed under the Moros’.
At the same time, self-interested parties should not be allowed to cynically
appeal to one oppressed people’s rights in order to deprive another oppressed
people of theirs. Both oppressed peoples will lose. A solution must be found to
ensure that all rights are simultaneously advanced. Though its provisions are
reassuring, the MOA-AD – or subsequent agreements – could go farther. For
example, it could explicitly state the following: that the Indigenous peoples’
ancestral domains will not only be recognised but protected from encroachment
through more specified measures; that the Indigenous peoples and non-Moros will
not be treated as second-class citizens within the BJE by stipulating that they
will enjoy equal rights and will be entitled to the same privileges and
services as the Moros; that the Indigenous peoples will likewise enjoy self-determination
through the establishment of political institutions that ensure their autonomy;
and that the Indigenous peoples, should they decide to be part of the BJE, can
still subsequently withdraw from the BJE if they so desire.
Beyond nationalisms
A world
divided by ethnicity – with each group of people that claims its own identity
fighting for its own piece of land – will be a world of endless wars. Instead
of subdividing the world into more and more states based on constructed notions
of ethnicity, race or nationhood, we should move towards creating a world drawn
together by our common humanity. The Earth’s lands and resources should belong
to everyone – and not to whoever happens to have been accidentally born within
the artificially and often arbitrarily drawn boundaries that enclose them.
Everyone should have equal rights regardless of their state or nationality.
Moving
towards this post-nationalist, post-imperialist world should not, however,
entail depriving the Moro people what other peoples now currently have: greater
autonomy or their own independent state. In recognising their right
to have their own state within the
But while the MOA-AD does not go far enough, it also does not close
the door on more substantive sovereignty for Moros in the future. By providing
an interval of time for the Moros to be empowered by having greater power over
their society and their resources, the Moros – wearied by fighting and
disadvantaged by dispossession – can have the opportunity to build their
collective capacity as a people. Achieving this affords them a better position
to exercise their democratic choice later. They can opt to remain within the
Philippines as part of the BJE. Alternatively, they can choose to have their
own state in a federal system which they would be able to jointly construct on
more equal terms with the rest of the Philippines – instead of being forced
into a federal system that they will have little role in designing, as current
proposals go. What should also not be ruled out, however, is that Moros may
actually opt to be part of a unitary
Otherwise, the Moros can and should be able to choose to have their
own independent state if they so wish. Recognising this right would not only
correct a historical injustice, doing so moves us one step closer towards a
world with more equality and less domination, and hence, one step closer
towards a post-imperialist post-nationalist world.
[Herbert
Docena is with Focus on the Global South and Stop the War
Coalition-Philippines.]
Notes
[i] For a historical background, see W.
K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the
Malays of Southern Thailand (Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press,
1990); Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City:
University of the Philippines Press, 1999); Kristina
Gaerlan, and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader
on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon City:
Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000); Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and
Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Pasig
City: Anvil Publishing Inc., 2000); Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent
Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Manila: Institute for Popular Democracy and
Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 2000); Patricio N.
Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the
Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press,
2000)
[ii] R.J. May, “The Wild West
in the South: A Recent Political History of Mindanao,” in Mark Turner, R.J.
May, Lulu Respall Turner (eds.), Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon
City, New Day Publishers, 1992); Samuel K. Tan, “The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro
Secessionism,” Mindanao Studies Report
1995/ No. 1; Aijaz Ahmad, “Class and Colony in
Mindanao,” in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels, Warlords,
and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon City, Institute for Popular
Democracy, 2000); Eric
Gutierrez and Saturnino Borras Jr., “The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and
Misdirected State Policies,” East-West Center Policy Studies, Number 8,
2000.
[iii] cited in Kit Collier, “The
Theoretical Problems of Insurgency in
[iv] Eduardo C. Tadem, “The Political Economy of Mindanao: An
Overview,” in Mark Turner, R.J. May, Lulu Respall Turner (eds.), Mindanao:
Land of Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon City, New Day Publishers, 1992); Samuel K. Tan, “The Socioeconomic Dimension
of Moro Secessionism,” Mindanao Studies Report
1995/ No. 1; Aijaz Ahmad, “Class and Colony in
Mindanao,” in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels,
Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern
Philippines (Quezon City,
Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000); Eric Gutierrez and Saturnino Borras Jr., “The Moro Conflict:
Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies,” East-West Center Policy
Studies, Number 8, 2000.
[v] See Kristina Gaerlan, and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels, Warlords, and
Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in
[vi] Soliman M. Santos Jr. “BJE and the
question of independent statehood,”
[vii] “Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
[viii] “Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
[ix] For example, the agreement is
supported by the Anak Mindanao party-list, a secular left-leaning political
party of Moros, as well as the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy, a
group that includes moderates and conservatives, plus peace groups such as the
Mindanao Peoples Caucus, a broad grouping that includes Christians and
indigenous peoples in its membership, to name a few.
[x] Public forum,
[xi] Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J.
Amoroso, State and Society in the
[xii] See for example the editorial
“Designed to Fail,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer,



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