Boris Kagarlitsky on the Russia-Georgia conflict

 

Bad habits are contagious

By Boris Kagarlitsky

August 14, 2008 -- Georgia has resolutely condemned Russia's actions in Chechnya. Russia has severely criticised NATO actions towards Serbia. Later on the Georgian authorities tried to do the same thing in South Ossetia as the Russian authorities had done in Chechnya. Moscow decided to treat Georgia in the same way as NATO had treated Serbia. Bad habits are contagious.

Saying that after Western leaders had recognised Kosovo’s independence the standards of international law ceased to exist, Russian diplomats must have second sight -– a year had not yet passed when the Russian government ignored those standards. The laws were replaced by precedents and customs. From this standpoint, there are good reasons for Moscow’s campaign in South Ossetia. South Ossetia is de facto a republic, even if no one (including Russia) has recognised it. However, it became Russia's protectorate. How can Russia allow somebody to attack it?

Moscow appeals to the commonsense and the will of the South Ossetian population. Those who did not share this collective will were driven out of the republic a long time ago (the same holds true for Chechnya). Like Serbia, Georgia makes reference to history. But neither of that is of importance, only force is all important.

It goes without saying that the Georgian authorities realised that when they decided to follow Moscow's example and hold an operation to restore constitutional order in the country. They hoped not only that the Georgian army was stronger than the Ossetian one, but also that the USA would support them. It could take two days to capture the capital of South Ossetia Tskhinvali while the Russian authorities consulted with each other and with Washington. This plan had almost been fulfilled, but, as so often is the case, the important decisions were made by the field commanders rather than by the Kremlin officials: while the Russian authorities were consulting with each other, the Russian peacemaking forces, which were deployed in South Ossetia, joined the battle, received the air support and actually turned the Georgian-Ossetian conflict into the Russian-Georgian war.

This time, the Georgian elite (and Georgian society) were greatly disappointed again. America was not going to protect Georgia. The USA was going to use Georgia to counterbalance Russia, as a supplier of soldiers for the war in Iraq and as a diplomatic ally in the UN. But that does not mean that Georgia could use America as anything.

The right of the strong implies that the strong have no commitments to the weak. To be more exact, those commitments are met when it is in the interest of the strong. For example, Russia has met its formal and informal commitments to South Ossetia. The reason for Russia's interference in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict is in line with US propaganda: protection of its citizens.

By the way, it is a mystery how the South Ossetians, who live in Tskhinvali, were given Russian citizenship at a time when many people who have lived and worked in Russia for several years cannot get it. The South Ossetians do not pay Russian taxes and do not serve in the Russian army. They have no duties, they have only rights. The Russian government is reluctant to take care of many of its citizens living in Russia and to protect their rights.

However, from the formal standpoint, everything is right. Governments must protect their citizens. If the Russian authorities took better care of their citizens in Russia, the words that there is a need to protect “our people” in Tskhinvali would ring more true.

The military do not think about the diplomatic and legal details very much. They simply know that they have the superior firepower that should be used. The Georgian army applied this power to the Ossetians and shelled Tskhinvali. A few days later, Georgia was attacked by the Russian army.

The Russian generals told the curious journalists that the army bombed and fired at only the military installations. They were likely to issue such orders. But they were not concerned about what actually the bombs hit. Surprisingly, even the XXI century “smart” bombs, which are much talked about, hit residential districts instead of enemy fortifications.

After the Russian generals made another statement that in Georgia only the military installations had been bombed, the destroyed houses of the civilian population in Gori were shown on the Western TV. They looked just like the destroyed houses in Tskhinvali, which were shown on the Russian TV.

[Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Moscow-based Institute of Globalization and Social Movements.]

Comments

Boris Kagarlitsky on the Russia-Georgia conflict & video

[I oringinally posted this to the Marxism list (www.marxmail.org). At the request of an Australian comrade, I'm also posting it here.]

The talk seems better than the article. He says while he's an opponent of the current Russian government, Russia was responding to a provocation, and says clearly this wasn't so much a provocation from the Georgian side as it was a provocation from the American side.

This evoked the first applause in his talk from his London audience, BTW.

I think his stance and tone was very good for a Marxist speaking INSIDE Russia. For the "western" audience, the talk and article are confusing and off-base, at best. He assumes everyone knows and understands --which is true of Russians, probably, and perhaps even of his immediate London audience of leftists-- that Russia didn't start this, the Georgians did, egged on by the Americans. That supposition, as it applies to people in western Europe and most of all in the U.S., is entirely unjustified.

His attempt to attribute to Russian "field commanders" the decision to move into Georgia is simply incredible. The initial Russian deployment, by all accounts, was that of a unit or units equivalent to a heavy armored brigade by the end of the first day, or something very close to that mass. And the elements of this force *immediately* launched a counter-offensive.

That takes careful preparation and TONS of logistics. Thus it seems quite clear the Russians had very good intelligence, excellent intelligence, and tremendous confidence in it, to respond with heavy units for an instantaneous counter-attack, rather than lighter, more flexible and mobile units to establish a perimeter south of the peaks of the caucuses where the forces for a counter-attack would muster for a day or two, until the disposition of the enemy's forces and the extent of his advance could be determined.

The decision to counter-attack and do it immediately, and with overwhelming mass and firepower, was made IN THE PLANNING, long before the shooting. Meaning, among other things, it was based on intelligence about Georgia's planned operations. Basically, the events suggest the Russians had the detailed operational plans for the Georgian campaign, and set out to humiliatingly SMASH Georgian pretensions, grabbing their military by the scruff of their neck, pulling down their pants, and giving them a spanking they would not soon forget.

The leisurely mopping up operations this past week, after the collapse of Georgia's military as a coherent force a week ago, adheres to the same design. They went to all of Georgia's brand-new NATO-standard-compliant military bases and installations the U.S. built and equipped for them and quite thoroughly and completely trashed and destroyed them. They found Georgia's U.S.-supplied hardware and took what they wanted and destroyed the rest. They sank every ship in the Georgian navy, destroyed every plane in its air force, and took out every radar in its air defense grid.

From all I can tell, and contrary to Georgian and American claims, Russia did not make a significant effort to attack transportation networks or other "dual use" assets vital to the civilian economy. I've seen no reports that power plants or bridges were bombed nor harbors mined. This was a very specific campaign focused on Georgia's military assets. That the Americans can easily replace them in short order the Russians know. That isn't the point. A broader campaign aimed at infrastructure would have a longer effect in terms of Georgia's capacity to wage war against Russia. But Georgia's capacity to wage war against Russia is nil in any case. This was not an effort to make it harder or impossible for a re-armed Georgia to launch another adventure in two or three years. The message was, the Americans may give you their toys, but they will never defend you because they can't. Here. Look at this base they built for you. Watch us blow it up. Look at us turn their tanks and artillery and computers and radios into scrap.

Russia's final message came via Condy Rice. After bloviating all sorts of empty threats against Russia for a week, she came on a mission Friday two days ago and told Saakashvili he had to sign his acceptance of Russian-dictated surrender terms, which specifically legalized and authorized Russia's trashing of Georgia's military bases and equipment and specifically opened the question of the future status of Georgia's two "breakaway" provinces. It was a five-hour meeting, and Saakashvili eventually capitulated.

Putin must have had a good laugh listening to Condy's empty rhetoric in defense of Georgia's "territorial integrity" in the press conference she held minutes after forcing the president of that country to sign surrender terms that officially renounced it.

The truth is, the "West" has no leverage with Russia. An economic blockade would only mean Europe depriving itself of Russia's petroleum and gas. The agreement to deploy a "star wars" missile shield in Russia would be more convincing if the technology actually WORKED -- which it doesn't -- and if Russia didn't have the option to nuke Western Europe and the United States with missiles launches from thousands of miles away in Asia, way outside the range of any possible Polish shield, which it does. In a million and one ways the "West" has refused Russia's request to be admitted into the imperialist club, so even the "threat" to throw it out of the G8 or block its joining other "multilateral" institutions are devoid of substance.

Turning every last piece of US military equipment the Georgians have into scrap metal is Putin's way of reminding Bush that he can STILL nuke the U.S. back to the stone age, which is WHY the U.S. not only has to stand by and see its Georgian ally humiliated, but actually serve as Moscow's courier service in bringing the message that Saakashvili has NO CHOICE but to capitulate to Moscow-dictated surrender terms.

The stuff about "damaging long term relations" and promises of "a new cold war" are empty threats from Russia's perspectives. From where Putin sits, the old cold war never ended. Georgia turned out to be Russia's way of telling the Americans that from now on, this continuation of the cold war wouldn't be as one-sided as it had been for the last fifteen years, that Russia was through begging and retreating.

Joaquin

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